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Summary  findings
'T'he  cmerging economies of Singapore and Malaysia have  Trends in emiployment  composition in both Singapore
labor  markets  with  large  foreign  components  because  and  Malaysia  SuppOIrt the  assertion  that  fofeigni  labor
excess labor demand was for a long time met by foreign  policy effectively  targets worker-s  with skills at both
workers.  Immigration  policy  to manage  the inflow  of  extremes  of the  scale to fill gaps  in labor  demanld unmlilet
expatriate  labor  in the  two  countries  consists  of  highlaN  by nationals.
regulated  work  permit  systems  that  differentiate  workers  But the news  is not  all good.  A huge  informal  sector  o.'
by nationality,  skill level,  and  sector  of activity.  The  illegal  foreign  wvorkers in both  count]-ies suggests  a
associated  permit  fees vary across  these  parameters.  degree  of  policy  failure.
Has immigration  policy  effectively  managed  foreign  Household  survey data  fromn Malaysia  show that
labor  flows? These  two  countries'  containmnent of  the  foreign  workers  earii  less than  their  citizeni counterparts.
foreign  labor  force  at a time  of rapid,  sustained  growth  Foreign  labor  shares  in labor  markets  in the Gulf
suiggests that  it has.  Cooperation  Cotillcil  (GCCC)  countries  range  from  50  to
It is not  enorigh  to establish  a stable  macroeconomic  90 percent  of the  total  labor  force  in the  context  of
climate  with  favorable  investment  incentives  (as Kuwait  persistent  excess  demand  for  labor  concurrent  with)
has learned).  In Singapore  and Malaysia,  complementary  emerging  unemployment  among  nationals.  Policymakers
measures  help  make  their  immigration  policies  effective.  could  look  to Singapore  and  Malaysia  for  lessons in
Those  measures  include  nationalization  policies  that  limit  managing  foreign  labor.  Brtt replicating  Singapore's  or
opportunities  for expatriates,  institutional  capacity  to  Malaysia's  immigrationi  policies  alone,  without
implement  and  enforce  policy,  a macroeconomic  addressing  existing  employment  and pay distortions,  max
environment  conducive  to growth  and  job creation,  and  have limited  success, given  the very different  economies
wage  and employment  policies  that  are mutually  and  institutional  environmiiienlts  in the  GCC.
reinforcing.
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I.  Overview
In a climate of increasing economic  integration and globalization, the exchange  of goods and
services has played a central role with respect to the growth of economies, at both the country and the
regional  levels.  Labor migration  has also been an important phenomenon.  Whereas labor flows into
most OECD countries peaked earlier in the century, with migration to Europe and the U.S. especially
high during post-conflict periods, the emerging economies of East Asia and the Middle East have been
affected by increasing international labor mobility during the past twenty-five years.  Labor inflows and
outflows  have  occurred  both  intra-regionally  and  across  continents,  facilitated  by  advances  in
communication,  transportation  and  technology  exchange,  and  driven  by  increasingly  competitive
international markets.
In the oil-producing  countries of the  Middle  East, rapid  development  financed  by  petroleum
revenues resulted  in robust  economic growth,  infrastructure development and the  expansion of public
goods provision.  This pattern was especially strong during the mid-to-late  1980s in the wake of high oil
prices.  Despite high population growth rates, the rising aggregate demand attendant to steadily increasing
incomes led to excess labor demand that could not be met by domestic  labor resources.  To resolve this
imbalance,  foreign  workers  were  "imported"  to  fill  the  gaps.  Over  time,  many  of the  GCC  (Gulf
Cooperation Council)  countries became highly centralized  economies  dominated by  the public arena,
consisting  primarily  of a  large  government  administration  and publicly  owned, oil-related  industries.
Labor markets  in this region exhibit considerable segmentation along public/private lines that is in fact
accompanied  (and exacerbated)  by  distortionary employment  and wage  policies  (World  Bank,  1994,
1995a,  1996).  Moreover,  the  distinction  and  separation between  domestic  and  foreign  workers  has
become more  apparent  in line  with the  growing  size of the  foreign  labor  force  in the  region.  The
presence of expatriate workers has in fact outgrown the indigenous workforce, and typically represents a
large majority,  as shown in Figure  1 below.  In Kuwait, Qatar and the  United Arab Emirates, over 80
percent of the labor force is foreign (Stalker, 1994).2
In  response  to  rapidly  Figure 1
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policies actually contributed to the proliferation of foreign workers, however.  In Kuwait, for example,
the decision to create public sector jobs for nationals led to high wage expectations among Kuwaitis, due
to relatively high wages and generous benefits in the public sector, and insufficient labor supply to the
private sector.  On the demand side, employers must finance the military service obligations of Kuwaiti
males, rendering foreign workers relatively less expensive.  These price and quantity controls effectively
distorted the labor market in Kuwait such that private  sector labor demand  had to be met by an ever-
present supply of cheap foreign workers.  In Bahrain, all foreign workers in the public sector other than
those judged to be indispensable were replaced with Bahraini nationals.  High public sector compensation
compared to  the  private  sector  led to  high  reservation  wages  and  queuing  for  govemment  jobs  by
Bahraini nationals, generating even greater demand for foreign workers to fill unskilled jobs despite the
additional costs of work permits.  Across the region, the composition of the pool of foreign workers has
evolved considerably over time, and the available supply has increased in conjunction with global:ization.
Moreover, policies  to  limit foreign  labor  face considerable challenges  because  they  may  be  counter-
productive with  respect to  economic  growth.  The tension  between  competing  objectives to  generate
employment through sustainable economic growth on the one hand, and to limit the number of expatriate
workers on the other hand, has impeded the efforts of GCC policy makers on both fronts.
Are there lessons from other regions that provide insight into effective labor management with
respect to  foreign labor?  Among the  emerging East  Asian economies,  Singapore  and Malaysia  have
experienced sustained and robust economic growth with considerable reliance on foreign labor.  As labor
importers, their policy  experience and  labor market outcomes are instructive  for policy makers  in the
GCC countries.  This paper analyzes the policies used to manage foreign labor in Singapore and Malaysia3
in terms of  immigration policies as  well as  related measures that  contribute to  their  successful
implementation.
The paper  is organized  as follows. Singapore's  and Malaysia's immigration  policies  are laid out
in section  II, followed  by a discussion  in section  III of additional  measures  that complement  immigration
policy, together forming a comprehensive  and effective strategy to manage foreign labor.  The fourth
section  describes  evidence  of trends in the composition  of labor  with respect  to citizenship,  and section  V
presents the results from regression  analysis  on Malaysian  household data to assess the determinants  of
earnings. The paper  then explores  additional  factors  contributing  to the success  of foreign  labor policy in
Singapore  and Malaysia,  as well as policy shortcomings,  evidenced  by large informal  economies  staffed
mostly by illegal aliens (sections  VI and VII, respectively). Finally, section  VIII concludes  the analysis
with a discussion  of the lessons  for GCC  countries  with respect  to the policy experience  of Singapore  and
Malaysia.
II. Foreign  labor management  policies  in Singapore  and Malaysia
Although Singapore  and Malaysia have relatively smaller foreign shares of total employment
compared  to the GCC experience,  they nevertheless  play host to vast numbers  of expatriates. Malaysia's
large formal economy employs 1.2 million foreigners (plus an  estimated 800,000 illegal aliens),
representing  a moderate  but still significant 13 percent of the labor force (according to the Malaysian
Ministry of Human Resources).1 More than one-fourth of Singapore's labor force consists of legal
foreign  workers,  numbering  an estimated  500,000  in 1997  (Wong, 1997;  Economic  Survey of Singapore,
1996). Both Singapore and Malaysia manage their large expatriate populations through complex and
tightly regulated  immigration  policy.
Singapore
Singapore's foreign labor management  relies on immigration  regulations in the form of work
permits.  There are four different types of permits that control both the quantity and quality of labor
entering Singapore. Permits  are differentiated  by skill level, sending country,  permit duration,  and sector
of work, and a variable  levy is charged  according  to classification. For example,  a permit is granted to a
I  The  foreign  labor  share  including  illegal  workers  is  estimated  at 20  percent.4
specific  firm  at  the  request  of the  employer.  The permit  application  must  specify  the  prospective
employee, his/her country of origin, the job to be perforrned and the duration of the job.  The number of
permits granted to employers is subject to a dependency ceiling, or dependency ratio, which is defined as
the maximum share of foreign workers in a firm's  total employment.  Dependency  ceilings are set for
each sector and are uniform across firms.  Although this  restriction is unduly rigid, since  it imposes a
single limit that is unlikely to be optimal for all firms within a sector, the Singapore authorities apparently
have the capacity to monitor  and enforce  it.2 The four permit types are: (i) work permit for unskilled
workers; (ii) work permit for skilled workers; (iii) employment pass; and (iv) entry/re-entry pernmit  (see
Table  I  for a  detailed summary).  Higher levies apply to the  less-skilled categories, thus  discouraging
over-reliance on cheap unskilled foreign labor.
Work permit for unskilled workers.  Unskilled workers who fall below a maximum salary cap
equal  to  S$2,000 per  month  (equivalent  to  US$1,190  per  month)  are  eligible  for  a  work  permit.3
Durations can last up to two years and are renewable up to a cumulative total of 4 years.  The monthly fee
for an unskilled work permit starts at  S$330 (US$196), which applies to the  service and  harbor craft
sectors, domestic workers  (e.g. maids, gardeners) and  manufacturing firms whose dependency ratio is
under 40 percent.  For employees of manufacturing firms who fall between the dependency ratios of 40
and 50 percent, the monthly fee is S$400 (manufacturing firms are subject to a two-tiered dependency
ceiling).  The maximum fee, equal to S$470 per month, is applicable to construction workers.  Employers
are required to post a S$5,000 (almost US$3,000) security bond for each worker, in order to guarantee
repatriation  following  the  expiration  of  the  permit.  Additional  restrictions  to  dissuade  perrnanent
settlement of unskilled foreign workers include limits to personal freedoms such as prohibiting reunion of
workers'  dependents,  marriage  to  a  Singapore national  and  pregnancy.  The  extreme  restriction  of
personal liberties is illustrated by the fact that women are subject to mandatory pregnancy tests and are
deported  in the  case  of a  positive result.  Workers holding  unskilled work  permits  are  ineligible  for
permanent  residence  and  must  leave  the  country  within  7  days  of  permit  expiry,  upon  threat  of
deportation.  The dependency ratios are lowest for services, at  1:3 (one foreign worker for every three
2  A flexible  system  of tradable  dependency  ceilings  could achieve  a more  efficient  allocation  of foreign  workers
that responds  to firm-specific  needs  while achieving  the same aggregate  foreign  employment  objective. There
is a rich literature  on the related  concept  of tradable  pollution  rights.
3  Throughout  the paper, conversions  from Singapore  to U.S. dollars  are calculated  using  the average exchange
rate over  the first  three quarters  of 1998  equal  to 1.68S$/US$  (International  Monetary  Fund, 1998).5
Singaporean workers), with  manufacturing evenly split between foreigners and  nationals; harbor  craft
firms, on the other hand, are predominantly foreign, with dependency ratios set at 9:1.
Work permit for skilled workers.  Skilled workers who fall below the same monthly salary cap
(S$2,000) are eligible for work permits  up to 3 years'  duration that  are renewable up to a total of  10
years.  They are available to workers in the construction, marine and harbor craft sectors, subject to the
same sectoral dependency ratios for  unskilled workers above.  Similarly, employers  must  purchase a
security bond, but workers are eligible for permanent residence and are not subject to limits on personal
freedoms, unlike their  unskilled counterparts.  The permit  fees  are  in fact  lower  for  skilled workers
compared to the unskilled, at only S$200 per month in marine and harbor craft firms and  S$100 in the
construction  sector,  resulting  in  relatively  less  disincentive  to  hire  skilled  foreigners  compared  to
unskilled foreigners.  Moreover, for 3-year permits, employers are exempt from paying the permit fee.
Employment pass.  Skilled workers with professional or tertiary qualifications can be hired with
an employment pass if their compensation exceeds S$2,000 per month.  Employment passes are valid for
up to 5 years and are renewable.  Although the S$5,000 security bond is still required, employment pass
holders are eligible for permanent residence after 6 months.  There are no dependency ceilings imposed
on this category of workers and no limits to personal freedoms.  Finally, no fee is charged to obtain a
pass.
Entry/Re-entry  permit.  Permanent  residents,  or  skilled  workers  holding  work  permits  or
employment passes who are also eligible for permanent residence, can be issued an entry/re-entry permit
that is valid for up to fiveiyears and renewable.  Also eligible for this type of permit are the skilled and
professional staff of foreign firms choosing to relocate to Singapore.  Entry/re-entry permits can also be
obtained for employees of firms that meet some minimum capital investment criteria.  No security bond is
required, no fee is charged, and services to ease the settlement and assimilation of workers into Singapore
society are provided by the government-established Social Integration Management Service to encourage
permanent integration of workers with desirable  skills into the  labor force.  Additional incentives for
permanent residency  include  access to  subsidized health  care,  education  and  housing.  Furthermore,
permanent residents are eligible to apply for citizenship after a period of 2-10 years.Table  1: Singapore's  Foreign  Labor  Management  System  of Permits  and Passes
Type of  Type of  Duration  Sector  Levy'  Maximum  National-  Security  Comments




Work Permit  Unskilled  up to 2  Manu-  S$330  1:1  NTS 2 S$5,000  Strictly limited personal
- Unskilled  workers with  years,  facturing  (< 40%  freedoms (e.g. no reunion
maximum  renewable  depend.);  of families, marriage or
salary of  annually  S$400  pregnancy); deportation
S$2000 per  for a total  (betw. 40%  within 7 days of permit
month,  of up to 4  and 50%  expiration; ineligible for
years.  depend).  permanent residence.
Construc-  S$470  5:1
tion
Marine  S$385  3:1
Service  S$330  1:3  NTS 2
Harbor  S$330  9:1
Craft
Domestic  S$330  Na  PRC 3
Worker
Work Permit  Skilled  up to 3  Construc-  S$ 100  5:1  NTS 2 S$5,000  Eligible for permanent
- Skilled  workers with  years,  tion  residence;
maximum  renewable  3-year permit holders
salary of  for a total  exempt from levy.
S$2000 per  of up to 10
month.  years.
Marine  S$200  3:1
Harbor  S$200  9:1
Craft
1/ Exchange  rate  averaged  over  January-September,  1998:  1.68S$fUS$.
2/ NTS denotes  non-traditional  source  countries:  Indonesia,  Thailand,  Sri Lanka, India,  Bangladesh,  Philippines,  Myanmar.
3/ PRC  denotes  workers  firom  the People's Republic  of China.Table  1: Singapore's  Foreign  Labor  Management  System  of Permits  and Passes  (continued)
Type of  Type of  Duration  Sector  Levy  Maximum  National-  Security  Comments




Employment  Skilled  up to 5  na  none  na  S$5,000  Eligible for permanent
Pass  workers with  years,  residence after at least 6








Entry/  Permanent  Renewable  na  none  na  none  Incentive mechanisms to
Re-entry  residents or  every 5  integrate and assimilate
Permit  those eligible  years.  into permanent labor
with skilled  force; permanent
work permit or  residents may apply for
employment  citizenship after 2-10










Immigration  policy in Malaysia  consists  of a system similar to that found in Singapore,  namely a
series of three permit types: (i) a visit pass for temporary  employment;  (ii) a visit pass for professional
employment;  and (iii) an employment  pass. In applying  for a permit, employers  identify  the prospective
employee  and specify the job to be performed and its duration. As such, permits are firm- and job-
specific and are non-transferable. Furthermore, foreign workers are subject to  age and nationality
restrictions  (Table  2 contains  a detailed  summary  of the system).
Visit pass for temporary  employment. Unskilled  and semi-skilled  workers  are eligible  for visit
passes  of short duration,  up to one year. Skilled  workers  are also eligible  if they fall below the salary  cap
of RM1,200  per month (equivalent  to US$302). 4 Workers  must be between 18 and 45 years of age, and
no resettlement  of dependents  in Malaysia  is allowed. A security deposit  is required  to cover  the cost of
repatriation  following permit expiry, and levies are imposed at differential levels depending on skill.
Visit pass levies range from RM840  per year for unskilled  manufacturing  jobs, to RM1,200  per year for
semi-skilled  jobs, to RM1,800  for skilled workers  in manufacturing.  Viewed as a payroll  tax, the permit
fee for skilled  workers  is equivalent  to at least 12.5  percent  of the wage. Only citizens  of the Philippines,
Indonesia  and Thailand are issued passes for domestic/household  employment;  for the manufacturing,
construction, plantation and service sectors, the list of eligible nationalities is extended to  include
Bangladeshis  and Pakistanis.  There are minimum income requirements for households to eimploy
domestic  workers,  in order to minimize  fraud, and visit pass fees for domestic  workers  are tax deductible
for employers.
Visit pass for professional  employment. Workers on short-term contracts with professional
qualifications  can be retained  with a visit pass for professional  employment. Contract  duration  is up to 12
months, and does not permit resettlement of families in Malaysia.  A security bond is required by
employers  hiring  foreign  workers  under this type of pass.
4  Conversions  to U.S. dollars  are  made  using  the average  exchange  rate over  the first  three quarters  of 1998
equal  to 3.97RM/US$  (International  Monetary  Fund, 1998).Table 2: Malaysian Foreign Labor Management System of Passes
Type  of  Type  of  Duration  Sector  Levy'  Nationalities  Security  Comments
permit  worker  (annual)  Allowed  Deposit
Visit Pass - Unskilled and  up to I year,  Manu-  Unskilled:  Bangladesh,  yes  Pass is employer- and job-
Temporary  semi-skilled  renewable  facturing  RM840;  Philippines,  specific;
Employment  workers, age  up to 5 yrs.  Semi-skilled:  Indonesia,  no resettlement of families into
18-45 years.  in Plantation  RM1,200;  Pakistan,  Malaysia.
sector,  Skilled:  Thailand.






Domestic  yes  Philippines,  Minimum income requirements
Worker  Indonesia,  for employers of domestic help
Thailand.  (RM2,000/month to employ
Indonesian or Thai maids,
RM4,000/month to employ
Filipino maids); levy payments
._______ .__  are tax deductible.
Visit Pass - Professional  up to I year  na  Pass is employer- and job-
Professional  workers on  specific;
Employment  short-term  no resettlement of families into
contracts with  Malaysia.
any  agency.  ____  _______
Employment  Skilled  at least 2  Manu-  Technical:  Can obtain visas for
Pass  workers with  years,  facturing  RM2,400;  dependents (i.e. dependent
a minimum  renewable  Professional  pass); number of key posts
salary of  for 5 years.  & middle  allowed depends on foreign





Other  yes  . ..
1/ Exchange rate averaged over January-September, 1998: 3.97RM/US$.10
Employment pass.  Skilled workers on contracts  of at  least 2 years'  duration  are eligible  for
employment passes,  provided that compensation exceeds the  minimum monthly  salary requirernent of
RM1,200.  The levies range from RM2,400 for technical personnel, to RM3,600 for professionals and
middle managers, and up to RM4,800 for upper level managers.  Passes are renewable up to 5 years, and
workers holding employment  passes can obtain visas  for their dependents.  The number of key posts
awarded to foreign workers is limited and depends on the level of a firm's foreign paid-up capital.
Permit system objectives
The growing presence of foreign workers in Singapore and Malaysia can be explained by excess
demand for labor associated with rapid economic growth, as well as the relatively cheaper cost of foreign
labor. This is attributable to the lower reservation wages of foreigners seeking employment opportunities
outside their home country labor markets which are characterized by excess labor supply and low wages.
In  addition,  expatriates  generally  tolerate  poorer  working  conditions  and  physically  demanding jobs
compared  to  Singapore  and  Malaysian  nationals  who  are  better-trained  and  have  higher  wage
expectations.  Moreover, foreign workers in Malaysia do not benefit from the same social protection in
terms  of the  pension  savings  scheme  requiring  employer  and  employee  contributions for  Malaysian
nationals, effectively  lowering the cost of foreign labor further.  As a result, strong demand for foreign
workers in an environment of robust economic growth led to the emergence of a large foreign labor force.
In order to stem the influx of expatriate labor and encourage the employment  of nationals, the
system of variable permits and fees effectively raises the cost of foreign labor, and enables the targeting
of workers to fill the skill gaps that emerge in the context of sustained  growth.  However, raising labor
costs negatively affects output, thereby impeding the over-arching objective of economic growth.  There
may be additional objectives with respect to foreign population size and labor force composition as well.
These  conflicting  objectives  highlight  the  tremendous  challenges  in  designing  effective  policies  to
achieve various results; moreover, policy objectives evolve over time.  In general, immigration policy in
Singapore and Malaysia seeks to manage foreign labor flows and at the same time facilitate growth by
targeting an appropriate skills mix.  It accomplishes this by directly affecting both the demand and supply
of  foreign  labor.  Singapore's  policy  provides  an  illustration:  unskilled  foreign  labor  demand  is
discouraged via  permit  fees,  which  are  in  fact  higher  compared  to  skilled  workers,  and  by  tightly
restricting personal freedoms and the immigration of dependents.I1
Singapore's  policy explicitly distinguishes between unskilled and skilled workers, targeting the
former for only temporary jobs by effectively placing them in a revolving pool of workers with high rates
of turnover.  This result is reinforced by sector-specific targeting of workers by nationality and gender,
leading to segregation and gendering into single-sex communities that are marginalized from Singaporean
society (Wong, 1997).5  In addition to generating hiring disincentives through price  signals (i.e. permit
fees and repatriation bonds), there is an economic justification  behind raising the price of foreign labor,
namely to cover the social cost of hosting foreign workers in terms of their consumption of public goods.
This is addressed in part by requiring employers to provide and finance housing for foreign employees;
Singapore's  government  bears  some  of this  cost  through  public  housing  targeted  to  foreigners  and
incentives to construct housing.  Highly skilled workers, by contrast,  are in demand especially  in the
context of greater international competition (e.g. in the financial services sector);  as a  result, they are
encouraged to emigrate through minimal restrictions on residence and naturalization, facilitated by non-
wage incentives.
Malaysia's  immigration  policy  is also  characterized  by  skills targeting,  but differs  from  the
Singapore model due to different foreign labor needs with respect to sector and skill demand.  Whereas
Singapore's status as a city-state with a small domestic population of 3.6 million implies that excess labor
demand was met by outside resources, this was not the case in Malaysia, whose population of 21 million
is geographically disperse.  Full employment of Malaysian citizens was not reached until 1991, compared
to  the  early  1970s  for  Singapore.  Despite  some  fundamental  differences  in  economic  structure,
immigration policy in both countries targets unskilled foreign workers for temporary contracts, whereas
skilled workers  can  remain  on  long-term  contracts,  albeit  subject  to  higher  permit  fees  relative  to
unskilled workers in the case of Malaysia.
III.  Complementary policy measures
An assessment of Singapore's  and Malaysia's  management of foreign labor cannot be limited to
immigration policy  alone.  An array  of  factors  contributes  to  particular  labor  outcomes  and  strong
5  For example, Thai and Bangladeshi  workers are targeted for construction  jobs, whereas manufacturing  and
service  sector firms  can only  hire foreigners  from traditional  source  countries. There are risks  associated  with
ethnic  specialization,  however,  illustrated  by the political  economy  issues  that emerged  in the aftermath  of the
Filipina  maid abuse  incident. The domestic  service  sector's over-reliance  on a single source  country  caused  an
exodus of domestic  workers returning home to the Philippines. While this did not have broad economic
implications,  the effect  could be significant  in a larger  or higher  value-added  industry.12
economic growth; this  section will  examine the relevant nationalization policies, macroeconomic
variables and  labor market regulations and  institutions that  affect foreign labor and  complement
immigration  policy and growth  objectives.
Nationalization
In conjunction with Malaysia's existing immigration  rules, policy makers introduced several
nationalization  measures in an effort to encourage firms to hire Malaysian citizens instead of foreign
workers. Under  the Seventh  Malaysia  Plan (1996-2000),  labor market policies focus on promoting  local
(i.e. Malaysian)  workers  through flexible  work arrangements  and the re-employment  of qualified  retirees.
Additional  measures  include  incentives  to increase  labor  mobility  toward areas with excess labor  demand
by providing  transportation,  for example,  and to encourage  the replacement  and repatriation  of expatriate
workers.  By directly increasing  the demand for Malaysian labor, nationalization  policies effectively
reinforce  the permit system  of foreign  labor  management.
It  is  important to  consider foreign  labor management policies  (both  immigration and
nationalization  policies) in the context of on-going measures  to promote the employment  of Malays in
particular. Malaysia  has a long history of multi-culturalism  and ethnic diversity; in 1975, indigenous
Malays represented  only half of the population,  while ethnic Chinese  represented  another  35 percent and
the remaining  share was mostly Indian (Blau, 1986). The share of Malays in the total population  has
grown,  and is projected  to reach 63 percent by the year 2000 (The Star Online,  May 7, 1996). Economic
activity  tends to be segmented  along ethnic lines, with Chinese  Malaysians  dominating  the comrmiercial
sector. Malays fare the least well; they live mostly in rural areas and have lower average incomes and
higher  rates of poverty. To address  this disparity,  affirmative  action measures  were adopted in the early
1970s  to encourage  the employment  of Bumiputra  (i.e. Malay)  citizens. Despite  the intervening  period  of
strong  economic  growth and increasing  incomes,  Malay  nationals  continue to occupy  the lower echlelons
of income  distribution. In 1987,  poverty  incidence  was estimated  at 21 percent for Malays,  9 percent  for
Indians and only 4 percent for Chinese (Ahuja, 1997;  World Bank, 1991). The 1995 household  sujrvey
data indicates that two-thirds of the poor are Malay, and although poverty incidence for the entire
population  is between  8 and 10 percent,  some 13 percent  of Malays  fall below the poverty line (according
to calculations  by Branko  Milanovic). 6
6  N.B.  The  poverty  incidence  definitions  used in the 1987  and 1995  analyses  are slightly  different.13
Macroeconomic  environment
The macroeconomic  context  in which  the labor  market  functions  is central  to labor  outcomes,  and
is in turn affected  by the regulatory  and institutional  framework  governing  employment  and wages. Both
Singapore  and Malaysia have established  macroeconomic  environments  conducive  to growth,  fostering
private sector activity and assigning a distinct role to foreign labor.  Labor market regulations and
institutions  affect the demand  and supply  of both domestic  and foreign labor,  thereby affecting  economic
growth.  In general, Singapore  can be characterized  as a highly regulated society in which the state
influences  economic  as well as civic behavior  through restrictive  rules under which individual  rights and
preferences  are subjugated  to the goals of the state. The Singapore  labor market, by contrast, operates
relatively  free from state interference  in the form of protective labor legislation. There is no minimum
wage, free "conciliation"  and arbitration services are provided  to workers and employers  for dispute
resolution, and workers are permitted to join unions, all of which are government-sponsored  (private
unions were abolished  in the 1960s).
On the other hand, the government  of Singapore  plays a central role in wage determination. In
1972, a tripartite commission  was established  to address labor unrest; the National Wages Council was
formed as a consultative body to  advise the government on wage policy by recommending  wage
increases  that are linked to observed  productivity  gains and are consistent  with overall macroeconomic
policy objectives.  Beginning in  1988, a flexible two-part wage structure was widely implemented,
consisting  of a base wage and a variable  wage portion,  respectively  averaging 84 and 16 percent of total
average wages in  1995.  Increases in the variable wage are linked to productivity  growth, thereby
promoting  worker productivity  and allowing  employers  greater flexibility to make more economic,  less
political decisions  regarding incomes  policy. Representatives  from government,  private employers  and
employees mutually agree on  the  proposed wage  increases, heretofore always accepted by  the
government. The Council's recommendations  have gained  credibility  over time, and were adopted  by 70
percent of private firms in 1985.7 As a result, Singapore  has successfully  kept inflationary  pressure in
check in an environment  of rapid economic growth.  The Council's collaborative  and representative
structure  contributes  to social cohesion  (not difficult  in periods of growth,  although  the 1985-87  episode
of an actual decline in wages did not result in disruptive popular  dissent); however, its effectiveness  is
7  This represents a marked improvement since 1972, when only 9 percent of private firms adopted the guidelines.  Such
broad consensus despite the fact that the recommendations are strictly optional indicates a wide and increasing acceptance
of the Council's  wage-setting process.  For a discussion, see Taschereau and Campos (1997).14
facilitated  by  the  fact  that  unions  are  government-approved  and  generally  pursue  employment-
maximizing objectives.
Despite a certain degree of government interference in wage-setting through the National  'Wages
Council,  Singapore's  labor market responds to market signals, in part because wage policies provide the
right  incentives.  The  special  consensus-building  role  of  Singapore's  tripartite  advisory  council  is
mirrored by  a similar institution established in Malaysia in 1991.  Under a broader mandate to  supply
policy advice, the Malaysian Business Council provides a forum for dialogue on economic and business
policies  among  its members  who  are business  leaders,  policy  makers  and  government  workers.  Its
objective is to facilitate constructive  exchanges and  foster  partnership between the public  and private
sectors in order to effect policies that are conducive to industrial development and private sector growth.
The expanding private sector investment and privatization witnessed in Malaysia during the mid--1  990s
suggests an  important  role for  the  Council  and  the  related  Budget  Dialogue  Group,  by  facilitating
information flows and coordinating policy response to a changing economic environment (Campos and
Root, 1996).
During the last decade, the industrial  relations climate in Malaysia has evolved towards  a pro-
business stance, evidenced by the formalization of once informal consultative councils; nevertheless, it
continues to be  affected  by a  series  of regulations  originally  adopted  in the  1950s and  1960s.  For
example, union membership is legally protected, although general broad-based unions are prohibited and
strikes are subject to certain  pre-conditions.  There are  some restrictions  on  firing, and workers  have
recourse to free adjudication  services  in the  event  of disputes with  employers.  Labor standards  are
codified  in legislation determining minimum benefits,  annual and  sick  leave, maximum  overtime, and
limits on  the type  payroll deductions  permitted.  A new  housing  standards  act was  adopted  in  1990
requiring plantation employers to provide a minimum level of amenities to workers on estates.  Despite
this relatively high degree of regulation, there is no minimum wage, and wage policies appear to be fairly
flexible, as expected in a tight labor market (Anandarajah (1997) reviews Malaysia's  labor legislation).
In view of the great strides in stimulating private sector activity  in Malaysia, it is unclear to what extent
labor market institutions have aided or hindered this.
As mentioned above, inflation was kept in check while economic growth boomed; in Singapore,
consumer prices rose by an annual average of 5 percent during the first half of the 1980s, and a modest  I
to 2 percent since then, while budget surpluses  consistently exceeded  10 percent of GDP  in the  1990s15
(until the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis).  Malaysia, on the other hand, has maintained  annual
inflation  around  4 percent during this decade, and fiscal accounts  were balanced in the early 1990s  and
subsequently  moved  into surplus. Foreign  participation  was encouraged  through fairly liberal  investment
codes, and domestic  private savings  were mobilized  via the Employees'  Provident  Fund in Malaysia  and
the Central  Provident  Fund in Singapore. Both are essentially  forced savings  mechanisms  to encourage
workers  to save for retirement. Employers  and workers share a mandatory payroll tax that accrues to
individual savings accounts, and withdrawals are contingent on retirement or disability, with some
provisions  for housing  investments. 8
Interaction  between  immigration  and macroeconomic  policy in Singapore
Based on the above analysis, both Malaysia and Singapore  appear to have established stable
macroeconomic  conditions  (prior to the 1997-98  East Asian financial crisis) and a policy environment
conducive to private sector growth in which foreign labor plays an integral role.  Up to this point,
immigration policy and macroeconomic  policy have been considered separately; it is instructive to
examine  the interactions  between  the two. In fact, Singapore's  immigration  policy has evolved  over time,
demonstrating  a degree of flexibility to respond  to a changing  macroeconomic  climate and sometimes
driven  by political pressures. Foreign labor management  in Singapore  can be divided into three distinct
stages since 1965,  each representing different policy objectives (Wong (1997) presents a  thorough
chronology  of Singapore's immigration  policy). The initial period was characterized  by a severe labor
shortage and a  large jump  in the quantity of foreign labor, primarily Malaysians.  Permits were
introduced,  accompanied  by levies for foreign workers in the construction  sector, and immigration  was
extended  to non-traditional  source countries  (i.e. Bangladesh,  India, Sri Lanka, Philippines,  Thailand  and
Indonesia). Permits also were extended to household  workers (e.g. maids) to facilitate the increase in
labor  force participation  among Singaporean  women. In general, permits for Malaysians  were much less
restrictive  than  for foreigners  from other countries.
8  The total contribution rate to Malaysia's Employees'  Provident Fund is equal to 22 percent of net wages (as of 1993) and
interest earned on contributions accrues to individual savings accounts.  Withdrawals may be made in the event of death,
incapacitation  or for  an  optional  housing  finance  scheme.  There  is no  provision for  unemployment  or  health care,
however.  Singapore's  Central Provident Fund has a total long-term  contribution rate of 40 percent of  net wages.  In
addition to old-age and housing withdrawals, the Singapore system also permits financing of pre-approved investments,
hospitalization and other health care charges (see Asher (1994) for a detailed discussion).16
The second period began in 1981 with a policy announcement  that foreign workers  were to be
phased out completely by 1986 (except in construction,  ship-building  and domestic services from non-
traditional source countries). This was followed  by measures  to impose levies on all unskilled foreign
workers and to restrict access to the social security system (Central Provident  Fund) to skilled foreign
labor only.  Rising labor demand was met by extending  permits to migrants from other (mostly Asian)
countries of origin.  As  economic development objectives shifted toward high-tech industries, the
booming construction  sector contributed  to continued foreign labor growth.  When economic  fortunes
turned, however, immigration  policy effectively  reversed  the inflow of foreign labor; during the 1985-6
recession,  102,000  jobs were eliminated  and 60,000  foreign  workers  were forcibly  repatriated.
A  comprehensive levy  system was  implemented in  1987 and  dependency ceilings were
introduced (foreign workers were limited to 50 percent of a firm's total employment). Levies were
viewed  as flexible  pricing mechanisms  to equalize  the cost of foreign  labor  relative  to domestic labor;  this
change in official policy reflected an admission that foreign labor was in fact an  integral part of
Singapore's work  force  (in  contrast to  the  earlier  objective of  minimizing imported  labor).
Administrative  measures  were added  thereafter  to improve enforcement  (such as punishment  by caning
for overstayers). Levies were extended  to Malaysians  in 1989,  and the dependency  ceiling was lowered
to  40 percent.  The criteria for issuing employment passes and permanent residence status were
liberalized  in 1989,  especially  to attract
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The third period of foreign  labor management  policy coincides  with the strong economic  growth
experienced  during the 1990s  which did not diminish  the demand for labor; in response to employers'17
needs, foreign labor (both legal and illegal) expanded. This was facilitated  in part by easing  migration
restrictions:  dependency  ceilings  were liberalized  (raised  to 45 percent in manufacturing,  and up to a ratio
of 5:1 in the construction  sector)  and a two-tier levy system  was implemented  in the manufacturing  sector
in which a premium was required for each foreign worker in excess of the 35 percent cut-off.  For
example, up to the 35 percent dependency ceiling, the per worker levy was S$300 per month; for
additional workers between 35 percent and 45 percent, the unit levy was S$450 per month. 9 This
resulted in sustained  and increasing  growth in the non-resident  population,  which grew at an annual rate
of 2.7 percent in 1991, rising to 6.5 percent annual growth by 1996, outpacing  the growth of residents
(see Figure 3).  It was at this time that more radical policy reform  was being considered  in terms of an
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In response  to the increasing  pressures  of international  competition,  there has been a concerted
effort to attract "talent", namely highly skilled experts, through additional incentives  such as housing
benefits. Not only is immigration  policy integrally linked to macroeconomic  policy to achieve growth
targets and increase market share, but it also complements  population policy.  In effect, immigration
policies  have  been used to mitigate  the negative  demographic  trends of a declining  indigenous  population
by encouraging  young foreign  professionals  to settle permanently. Persistent  labor shortages  have led to
more  prevalent  easing  of  requirements  through  exceptions,  such  as  allowing  municipal  cleaning
contractors to hire from non-traditional sources in order to meet demand (Straits Times Interactive,
December  3, 1996).
9  In June of 1997,  the levy  was reduced  to S$400,  and the two-tiered  dependency  ceilings  were raised to 40 and
50 percent. The levy  was subsequently  raised  to S$440.18
Most recently, the East Asian financial crisis had a palpable impact on the Singapore economy,
particularly through the depreciation of the exchange rate, and will certainly translate into slower growth.
Although there has been no explicit threat of mass repatriation of foreigners as in neighboring Malaysia,
unions have responded by calling for wage adjustments to the flexible "bonus" portion of wages before
undertaking retrenchment.  Many have cited the need to retrain low-skilled workers who are likely to be
laid off and are not employable elsewhere at their current skill level.  The government responded to these
negative macroeconomic shocks by effectively  increasing the tax on foreigners through eliminatling the
tax  deduction  for  foreign  worker contributions  to  the  Central  Provident  Fund.  Because  employer
contributions are not mandatory, unlike  for Singapore nationals, this de facto  tax  increase discourages
participation by removing the employer's  incentive to contribute, implying a tax-hit to foreign workers
that is double in magnitude (i.e. for the total contribution), and simultaneously reducing private savings.
A tighter permit allocation system and  stricter enforcement measures were introduced, effective
in 1998, in which permit entitlements are issued to main contractors only, who will be held responsible
for the foreign employees of their sub-contractors.  Moreover, main contractors are required to employ
and house workers laid off and abandoned (i.e. not repatriated) by sub-contractors; failure to do so results
in forfeiture of the S$5,000 security bond per worker in addition to exclusion from any future application
for  permit  entitlements.  In  March  1998,  additional  adjustments  were  made  to  encourage  higher
productivity in the construction sector through increases in the levy on unskilled workers, from S$440 to
S$470 per month, and sharp cuts in the levy on skilled workers, from S$200 to S$100 (Straits  Timnes,
March 19, 1998). This wider disparity in permit pricing for skilled vs. unskilled workers provides greater
incentives for  employers  to  hire more  productive  labor.  Table  1 above  provides  a  summary  of the
current dependency and levy parameters by sector.
This  catalogue  of  changes  in  Singapore's  immigration  policy  over  the  last  three  decades
demonstrates a capacity to adjust to the current economic environment by promoting the latest priority
objectives.  Initially facilitating expatriate inflows to meet excess demand, immigration policy evolved to
restrict the foreign labor market more tightly; ultimately, however, the need to attract skilled workers was
recognized  and  embraced.  These  policy  changes  were  typically  achieved  indirectly through  price
controls to effect a change in the quantity and composition of labor, but also directly through restrictions
on the quantity of permits issued.  The complexity of the system, especially in the context of a fluctuating
economic environment,  requires considerable  monitoring and  discreet and  frequent  adjustments.  The
Singapore authorities  proposed to reform the system  in 1991 by  implementing tradable  permits whose19
prices  would be determined  through a market mechanism. The so-called  "tender" system  was proposed
by the Ministry of Labor to eliminate the guess-work  in price setting and enable labor to respond to
market signals. Intended to work like the system in place for Certificates  of Entitlement  for cars, the
tender system would allow employers to bid for extra work permits above the dependency ceiling;
permits  would  be issued  for a duration  of 2 years, and each sector  would have its own system and market
for exchange.  Despite the economic efficiency arguments supporting the new system, however, the
proposal  was withdrawn  due to opposition  from unions (seeking  to protect the  jobs of their members)  and
employers  (who  feared  uncertainty  in labor  costs and labor  supply).  10
Overall, the  Singapore experience provides an  example where  the  interaction between
immigration and  macroeconomic  policies was mutually reinforcing, in  some ways improving the
effectiveness  of both.  Policy makers have managed foreign labor resources in conjunction  with the
performance of  the  macro-economy, easing permit  requirements to  attract  particular skills,  or
alternatively  tightening requirements  to shed labor during economic  downturns,  thereby using foreign
labor  as a buffer against  economy-wide  shocks. On the other  hand, the failure of attempted  policy  reform
in terms of the proposed tradable permit system illustrates the potential role of vested interests and
political economy  vis-a-vis immigration  policy and labor demand. It is easy to conceive  a situation in
which poorly integrated  policies generate contradictory  incentives.  Singapore's track-record  highlights
the importance  of careful and comprehensive  policy  that is not undermined  by existing  distortions.
IV. Trends  in the composition  of labor
Based on the robust economic  performance  of Malaysia  and Singapore  during  the last decade and
in view of their reliance  on expatriate  labor, general conclusions  can be drawn  regarding  their successful
management  of the large foreign labor force through immigration  policy and complementary  measures.
Is there more  substantial  evidence  of policy effectiveness  in managing  foreign  workers? Micro-level  data
exists for both Singapore  and Malaysia, generated  through periodic labor force surveys and household
income and consumption surveys; although only summary data is available for Singapore, recent
10  Manufacturers  reportedly  worried  that multi-national  corporations  would  have  a comparative  advantage  in
buying  up permits  (Straits Times,  October  7, 1991).  Although  the  existing  two-tier  system  is less  efficient  and
less  responsive  to the  market,  they  argued,  at least  it  provides  flexibility  at a known  price. In the  existing  tight
labor  market,  it was  feared  that  permit  prices  would  be very  high and  that concomitant  speculative  behavior
would  increase  uncertainty.20
household level data is available for Malaysia. The 1995 Household Income  Survey data covers a large
sample,  documenting  the  earnings,  work  activities  and  education  profiles  of  36,700  households  in
Malaysia.  The extent of the survey's  coverage of foreign workers is likely to be fairly representative,
since non-citizens represent  4.5 percent of the sample (or about  1600 observations),  which  would be
equivalent to nearly a million foreigners in a tota] population of 21 million.  This is not inconsistent with
official statistics that foreign workers number  1.2 million, clearly  within the same order of magnitude.
The survey does not include illegal foreign workers,  however, estimated to account for  an additional
800,000 workers.
Looking at the individual characteristics of foreign workers in Malaysia and Singapore compared
to nationals gives a sense of the degree to which immigration and other policies have effectively targeted
foreigners  for unskilled  and  skilled positions.  The evidence suggests that  policies  indeed affect  the
composition of foreign labor.  The ethnic and sectoral segmentation observed in Singapore is consistent
with policy that targets foreign workers by country of origin for certain categories of work.  As shown in
Figure 4, the majority of foreign workers are from Malaysia, the so-called traditional source country, and
are primarily employed in manufacturing and services; Malaysians employed in the construction sector
are  typically  skilled  workers  (Wong,  1997).  Expatriates  from  Thailand  and  Bangladesh  are
predominantly employed in the construction sector, in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs,  and an estimated
25 percent of all foreigners are employed as domestic servants, primarily  women from the Philippines.
Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
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How does the foreign worker population  fare relative  to the domestic  population  with respect to
income? In Singapore,  there is a higher  concentration  of foreigners  at both the bottom and at the top of
the income scale (Chew and Chew, 1992).  Whereas non-citizens  accounted for 10 percent of total
employment  in 1989,  nearly 25 percent of the lowest  income group  were non-Singaporean  (see Figure 5);
the same pattern emerges among  top income earners. This suggests that low-wage unskilled  jobs are
more  likely to  be  held  by  foreign
workers  compared  to their proportional  Figure  5
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Using  the Malaysian  survey  data, the sample can be broken into deciles according  to household
per capita income  to evaluate  the distribution  of foreigners  and nationals  across income  groups. A pattern
similar  to that observed  in Singapore  emerges. Whereas  the sample mean for the share of non-citizens  is
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dichotomy in the quality of jobs  held by foreigners.  Clumping  at the  extremes of the scale reflects a
greater demand for expatriates in unskilled jobs as well as in highly skilled or professional positions.
It  is interesting to decompose total  household earnings  into the  various sources  of income to
examine  how  these  differ  between  Malaysians  and  non-Malaysians.  Sources  include  employment
income, pensions, gifts  in  cash  and  in  kind, property  income  and other  transfers.  For  citizens, the
incidence of individuals receiving pensions is generally low and rises across deciles until a peak in the
7th decile,  in which almost 7 percent receive a pension.  By contrast, few non-citizens  earn a pension:
incidence is zero for half of the non-citizen population, below  one percent for deciles 6 through 9, and
jumps  only to 2 percent for the richest decile of foreign households.  Gifts are relatively more important
to the poor, but the impact is similar for poor Malaysians and poor non-Malaysians.  In the poorestdecile,
for  instance,  gifts represent  4  and  5 percent  of net  household  income  for  non-citizens  and  citi.zens.
respectively; this  share falls to 3 percent of income in the middle deciles and only  I percent for the top
income groups.
The employment  status of non-Malaysians  provides  another  indication  that  the  labor  mrarket
responds to immigration policy; non-citizens are much more likely to be employees rather than employers
or self-employed, compared to the work status of Malaysian citizens.  For example, 90 percent of non-
citizens in the sample are employees, versus 68 percent for citizens.  Self-employment, herein defined as
own-account workers, is much more common among Malaysians, nearly  30 percent of whom are self-
employed, compared to under 10 percent for non-Malaysians.1 1 This is not surprising given that foreign
workers entering the country legally must be sponsored by a prospective employer; the exception is the
employer  category  (representing  a  mere  1 percent  of non-citizens)  which  includes  foreign  investors
seeking to set-up business in Malaysia.
The  income  implications  of  these  employment  status  results  are  ambiguous  at  this  stage.
Milanovic (1998) finds that self-employment  in Malaysia is much more common among the poor, and
that the incidence of poverty is 32 percent for those primarily self-employed in agriculture, compared to
10 percent for the population at  large.  On the other hand, the greater  share of own-account workers
among Malaysians corroborates  earlier assertions by Blau (1986) that workers in Malaysia tend to move
The 1995 labor force survey yields somewhat  different estimates  for own-account  workers: 19 percent for
Malaysians,  9 percent  for non-Malaysians  (Malaysia:  Labor  Force Survey  Report  1995).23
from employee  status to self-employment  at older ages. Naturally, this is easier for citizens than non-
citizens,  due to the time limits on foreign work permits. A similar pattern of work status is observed in
Kuwait,  where there is a tendency for Kuwaiti  public sector employees  to retire upon eligibility,  prior to
retirement age, and become self-employed,  or in fact shift from part-time informal activity to devoting
full-time  to their on-going ventures in the private sector. Blau (1986) also finds that earnings  of urban
self-employed males  are  higher  than  their  counterparts with  similar  characteristics in  wage
employment. 12 Neither  Milanovic  (1998) nor Blau (1986)  distinguish  between  citizens  and non-citizens,
however;  more detailed analysis of the determinants  of earnings is necessary to test the relationship
between  employment  status and income,  and will be undertaken  using the 1995  household  survey  data in
the following  section.
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Are there other trends in the composition of  labor in  Malaysia that reflect foreign labor
management  policies?  Consider the characteristics  of individual households with respect to family
structure, size and age.  The marital status of citizens differs markedly from that of non-citizens;  the
restrictions  on the reunion  of families  for workers  holding  visit passes is borne out by the lower incidence
of marriage among non-Malaysians,  as well as the smaller household size.  Whereas 79.8 percent of
Malaysians  in the sample are married, only 68.1 percent of non-Malaysians  are married (see Table 3).
12  There  is a growing  body of evidence  contradicting  the widely  accepted  dual labor  market  assertion  that
informal  self-employment  earnings  are  lower  than  forrnal  wages;  for example,  Maloney  (1998)  finds  evidence24
Moreover,  singlehood  is  uncommon  Table 3: Household Characteristics in Malaysia, 1995
Citizens  Non-citizens among Malaysians, less than  10 percent  Marital Status (% of sample):
of  those  surveyed  were  single,  Single  9.1  27.5
compared  to  27.5  percent  of  non-  Married  79.8  68.1
Other  11.1  4.4
citizens.  Average household  size also  Household size (# of members)  4.6  3.8
varies  according  to  citizenship.  For  Age (years):
Male  44  34
Malaysians, households have a mean of  Female  49  33
4.6  members,  with  a  fairly  normal  Total  sample  of 36,700  observations,  of which 95.5 % are
Malaysian.
distribution.  Non-citizens,  however,
typically reside in smaller households, averaging 3.8 members; the observed log-normal distribution also
indicates a higher concentration  among smaller households.  The age composition of foreign workers
compared to Malaysian nationals  lends further support to the assertion that immigration policy targets
foreign labor for only temporary contracts, discouraging  permanent settlement among the  low-skilled.
The mean age for males interviewed was 34 for non-citizens and 44 for citizens.  The discrepancy aLmong
women is even greater, with female non-citizens averaging 33 years of age, compared to  49 yeairs for
citizens.
V.  Determinants of earnings in Malaysia
The results comparing the group profiles of  Malaysians and non-Malaysians on the basis of age,
marital  status,  household  size,  type  of  employment  and  sources  of  income, are  consistent  with  the
predicted effects of foreign labor management policy.  In an effort to assess the actual policy impact, the
analysis in this section investigates the determinants of earnings using regression analysis on household
income data and controlling for  individual characteristics.  Malaysia's  immigration policy suggests that
foreigners will be paid  less than  Malaysian citizens with  similar characteristics,  due to the added unit
labor cost incurred by employers for work permit fees.  In theory,  the wage gap between citizens and
non-citizens at the margin should be equal to the permit fee (minus any savings in employer charges for
social benefits unavailable to foreigners).  The following analysis measures the difference in earnings on
the basis of citizenship and other variables such as employment status, region of work and gender.  By
assessing the variables that contribute to earnings, I derive precise and robust conclusions with respect to
that contract  employees  and self-employed  workers  (including  small  business  owners) earn more  than salaried
workers  in Mexico's  formal sector.25
wage and employment  patterns in Malaysia. It is important  to note that earnings  analysis  typically  uses
labor force  survey  data, which consists  of data on the sources  and levels of income  for a particular  worker
as well as his/her  individual  characteristics.  Unfortunately,  only household-level  data is available  for this
analysis  on Malaysia;  this distinction  does not diminish  the validity  of the results, however.
In order to analyze the determinants  of income, it is necessary to establish at the outset the
appropriate  measures  of income. The analysis considers  two dependent  variables, the logs of (i) total
labor income  and (ii) net household  income. The reasons  are two-fold. In order to determine  the effect
of immigration  and labor market policy on employment  and wages, I use total labor income, which is
equal to earnings from wages and other employment.  This allows me to detect pay practices that
discriminate  against non-Malaysians,  for example,  as well as wage discrimination  (positive  or negative)
against  ethnic groups  among Malaysian  citizens. On the other hand, I do not wish to exclude  other types
of income that may also be affected  by labor management  policies.  I therefore use household  income
including all sources, thus creating a more complete picture of various economic activities and the
associated remuneration across population groups.  After-tax income, i.e. net household income,
represents a more appropriate  measure of disposable income and at the same time avoids biasing the
results with respect  to non-citizens,  who generally  have a smaller tax burden. Two separate  regressions
are run, one for each dependent  variable.
What factors  affect household  income? Earnings  vary by occupation,  experience,  skill level and
employment  status (i.e. employee,  employer  or self-employed). The independent  variables used in this
regression analysis  are consistent  with the vast literature  on earnings  functions. They include:  age and
age 2, years of schooling,  region of employment,  status of employment,  household  size and category of
principle  occupation. Because  age and work experience  are correlated,  I do not include  work  experience
as an independent  variable; moreover,  the age2 variable is used to capture the shape of the age-earnings
profile. The survey data does not directly quantify  skill level; as a result, I rely on the measure of years
of schooling  as a proxy for skill level. 13 j  use additional individual characteristics  on gender and
citizenship  to capture discrimination  effects. The results from the two regressions  are shown in Table 4
below. All of the variables  are significant,  and the adjusted  R2 terms are fairly high at 0.36 and 0.38 for
dependent  variables labor and net household income, respectively,  suggesting that these 9 independent
]3  Despite  common  practice,  Gupta  (1998)  points  out that years of schooling  is unlikely  to reflect  perfectly
individuals'  skill  level  or productivity.26
variables together  explain more than  one-third of the variance  in incomes (earnings functions typically
have adjusted R2 terms near 0.3).
Table 4: Regression Results Testing for the Effect of Citizenship
OLS Regression
Dependent Variable:  In (Total labor income)  In (Net household incomne)
Independent variables:  Coefficientsa  Coefficientsa
Age  0.0329  0.0299
Age2 -0.0003  -0.0302
Education (years)  0.0197  0.0185
Household size  0.0648  0.0639
Citizen  0.0619  0.0164
Region 1: Peninsular Malaysia  0.0743  -0.0470
Region 2: Sabah  -0.1761  -0.2737
Female  -0.3367  -0.2094
Employer  0.2379  0.2982
Self-employed  -0.2695  -0.1I569
Unpaid family worker  -0.3412  -0.2249
Occupation 1: Managers  -0.1745  -0.1314
Occupation 2: Professionals  0.3861  0.3687
Occupation 3: Assoc. professionals  -0.4308  -0.4083
Occupation 4: Clerks  -0.3886  -0.3647
Occupation 5: Service workers  -0.7000  -0.6383
Occupation 6: Skilled agric. workers  -1.1690  -1.0845
Occupation 7: Craft-related workers  -0.6564  -0.6219
Occupation 8: Plant, machine operators  -0.5535  -0.5:368
Occupation 9: Elementary occupations  -0.7973  -0.7460
Constant  9.1410  9.1891
Adjusted R2 0.3785  0.3639
No. of observations  36,693  36,693
a  All significant  at the .01 level.
The results  of the  two regressions  are very  similar with  respect to  coefficient  values  for the
independent variables (results will be discussed jointly unless otherwise indicated).  The age coefficients
are around 3 percent, and for age2,  coefficients are very small and  negative, albeit  still significant, as
expected.  The returns to education are modest at around 2 percent.  Employment status proves to be an
important determinant  of earnings.  The returns  to  being an  employer  are high  relative  to  being an
employee, with  a coefficient  of 0.24 vis-a-vis  dependent variable labor earnings.  Self employment, on
the other hand, is poorly remunerated; labor income is 27 percent lower for an own-account worker than
for a wage earner with  similar characteristics.  This  result supports Milanovic (1998)  but contradicts27
earlier findings  by Blau (1986)  regarding self-employed  urban males; on the other hand,  Blau finds that
the other sub-groups  of own-account  workers indeed had lower earnings (i.e. urban females, and rural
males and females). 14
Although detailed information  on the occupational  codes is unavailable,  the broad single-digit
categories  are known,  and are included  as explanatory  variables  in order  to eliminate  any omitted  variable
bias introduced  by differential  pay lines  across sectors of production. The composition  of employment  is
fairly disperse  across  the 10 occupation  categories,  as shown in Table 5. This dispersion  is corroborated
by data from the 1995 labor  force survey (Malaysia  Department  of Statistics, 1996). The coefficients  on
occupations  1 through 9 are measured  relative to the income of a worker with similar characteristics  in
occupation  0, which consists of the police and the armed forces. The returns to the various occupational
categories are large in  magnitude, especially for agricultural workers (occupation 6) and unskilled
workers  (occupation  9) who earn far less, indicated  by negative  coefficient  values.
Table 5: Employment  Composition  by Occupation
Occupation  Category  Description  Share  (%)
Occupation  0  Police  and armed forces  3.6
Occupation  1  Managers,  senior  officials  4.1
Occupation  2  Professionals  4.1
Occupation  3  Technicians,  associate  professionals  6.1
Occupation  4  Clerks  8.0
Occupation  5  Service  workers,  shop  and market sales  9.1
Occupation  6  Skilled  agricultural  workers  18.0
Occupation  7  Craft-related  workers  4.8
Occupation  8  Plant  and machine  operators  7.0
Occupation  9  Elementary  occupations:  sales, services,  13.5
agriculture,  mining,  construction,  manufacturing
Total  100.0
N.B.  Data  missing  for  21.6  percent  of sample.
Household size is an important explanatory variable, contributing 6:4 percent to  household
earnings  (both labor and net income) per additional  household  member. Interpreting  this result requires
caution, since  the causality  between  earnings  and the number  of household  members is indeterminate.  It
14  The  different  results  for urban  males  might  be explained  by the fact  that  Blau's  regression  analysis  accounts
for hours and weeks  worked,  but does not include  occupational  category  or household  size among  the
independent  variables,  and  considers  Peninsular  Malaysia  only.28
may be the case, for instance, that economically  active members of large families work more hours;
alternatively,  it may be that higher  wage earners  can afford  to have larger  families.
Considerable segmentation is  observed with respect to  region of residence.  Labo:r force
participants  and activities are divided among the three main regions of Malaysia, namely Peninsular
Malaysia,  Sabah and Sarawak,  respectively  identified  as Regions 1, 2 and 3.  The regional variable has
significant  explanatory  power. In Peninsular  Malaysia,  for example,  wage-employment  as reflected  by
labor earnings is more important  relative to the other two regions. Sabah, by contrast, is the poorest
region, with a poverty head-count equal to  18 percent (Milanovic, 1998). Both labor and household
earnings  in Sabah lie below  those in Sarawak  and Peninsular  Malaysia.
The standard gender discrimination  against women is observed in Malaysia.  It is especially
severe for labor earnings, which are one-third lower than a male worker with otherwise identical
characteristics. The coefficient on the gender variable is somewhat  more moderate  with respect to net
household  earnings, falling to -0.21 (see Table 4).  This indicates  that gender discrimination  is more
prevalent  in wage  employment  but still significant  elsewhere.
Finally,  to answer the central question  of this investigation,  what does the analysis  yield for the
returns  to being a foreign  worker? Returns are negative  but small. This finding supports  the proposition
that foreign workers earn less than their Malaysian counterparts. With respect to labor earnings,  the
results yield a 6 percent  gap between  citizens  and non-citizens,  and only a 2 percent differential  vis-a-vis
net household  income. These coefficient  values indicate  that, despite  their lower social costs in terms of
transfers and benefits,  foreign workers  are paid less than citizens, reflecting  work permit fees that raise
the effective unit labor cost incurred by employers. The magnitude  of the earnings differential  is only
RM335  (based on average per capita labor income),  well below the minimum  permit fee of RMN840  for
unskilled  workers;  however,  this difference  may reflect  the lower employer  charges  for social benefits  not
available to foreigners.  The coefficient values on the citizenship dummy variable are smaller than
anticipated,  suggesting  that earnings  differentials  are due mostly  to other  factors.
Consider the  effect of  ethnicity.  Malaysia's labor market is  segmented not  only  along
citizenship, occupational and  regional lines, but  also  with  respect to  ethnicity.  The  economic
marginalization  of ethnic Malays mentioned  in section III led to affirmative action policies to address
implicit  discrimination. To what degree is ethnicity  a determinant  of income? I consider  this question  by29
transforming the citizenship dummy variable into two dummies that classify workers as Malay citizens,
non-Malay citizens and non-citizens.)5 Non-Malay citizens are predominantly ethnic Chinese, based on
the population composition discussed in section III above.
Two new regressions  were run  using  this  re-specified  earnings  function  (for both  dependent
variables,  as above).  The results,  reported  in Table  6, are  similarly significant, with  an even higher
adjusted R2 equal to 0.4.  By accounting for ethnicity among Malaysian citizens, the coefficients on all
the other independent variables change very little, except for the Region I dummy.  However, the citizen-
ethnic returns are much larger than under the broader citizenship variable.  For labor income, the returns
to being a citizen of non-Malay ethnicity are over  17 percent compared to a foreign worker, controlling
for other individual factors, and for net household income, the returns are smaller but still important, on
the order of 12 percent.  The data reveal considerable discrimination against Malay nationals, who earn
between  15 and 18 percent  less than  similar foreign workers (with respect to labor and net household
earnings,  respectively).  At  the  same time,  the  increase  in the  coefficient  on the  Region  I  variable
suggests that under the previous functional specification, this variable was capturing at least part of the
effect of Malay ethnicity among nationals in this region.
15  This  analysis  does  not consider  differential  discrimination  against  foreigners  by country  of origin.30
Table 6: Regression  Results  Testing  for the Effect  of Citizenship  and Ethnicity
OLS  Regression
Dependent  Variable:  In (Total  labor income)  In (Net household  income)
Independent  variables:  Coefficientsa  Coefficientsa
Age  0.0269  0.0243
Age 2 -0.0003  -0.0002
Education  (years)  0.0207  0.0194
Household  size  0.0726  0.0712
Non-Malay  citizen  0.1754  0.1224
Malay  citizen  -0.1457  -0.1776
Region  l: Peninsular  Malaysia  0.2074  0.0774
Region  2: Sabah  -0.1945  -0.2909
Female  -0.3422  -0.2148
Employer  0.1905  0.2540
Self-employed  -0.2571  -0.1552
Unpaid  family  worker  -0.3075  -0.1942
Occupation  1: Managers  -0.1602  -0.1179
Occupation  2: Professionals  0.3196  0.3065
Occupation  3: Assoc.  professionals  -0.4000  -0.3797
Occupation  4: Clerks  -0.4601  -0.4317
Occupation  5: Service  workers  -0.6687  -0.6090
Occupation  6: Skilled  agric.  workers  -1.1537  -1.0703
Occupation  7: Craft-related  workers  -0.6762  -0.6404
Occupation  8: Plant, machine  operators  -0.5979  -0.5782
Occupation  9: Elementary  occupations  -0.8251  -0.7721
Constant  9.1953  9.2400
Adjusted  R 2 0.4059  0.3923
No. of observations  36,693  36,693
a All significant  at the  .01  level.
Regression analysis of  the determinants of  earnings provides evidence that  foreign labor
management  policies affect labor outcomes by differentiating  workers on the basis of citizenship. The
labor  earnings  differential  with respect to non-Malay  citizens is equivalent  to RM946  (i.e. 17 percent of
average  labor  income),  a figure  more closely  aligned with permit fees in the lower end of the skills range.
The data also  indicate a  degree of  discrimination against ethnic Malay citizens, suggesting that
affirmative  action policies  have not fully eliminated  discriminatory  practices. (Both of these effects are
outweighed  by the severe discrimination  against women, however.) It would be interesting  to measure
the change  over time in returns to being an ethnic Malay,  to assess the degree  to which affirmative  action
policies have reduced discrimination. This could be done by carrying  out the same regression analysis31
using earlier data, for example  the 1976-77  Malaysian  Family Life Survey. I leave this question  as a
possible  avenue  for further  research.
VI. Success  Factors
The micro-level  data on the composition  of households  with respect to age, type of employment
and earnings,  together with evidence  of differential  compensation  for citizens vs. non-citizens  suggest
that immigration  policy, possibly in conjunction  with complementary  measures,  can control the quantity
and quality of foreign labor. It is likely that additional  factors played a role in policy effectiveness  in
Malaysia and Singapore, in view of their particular country circumstances. In the first place, both
countries exhibit tremendous institutional  capacity to implement and enforce regulations. Singapore's
priority of the state over individual  preferences  facilitates  policy effectiveness,  albeit at the expense of
individual  rights. The permit system,  involving  issuance  of new permits  to large numbers  of applicants  as
well as the renewal  of expired  permits subject  to eligibility,  requires substantial  monitoring,  enforcement
and effective  administration. Singapore's  Work Permit and Employment  Department  of the Ministry of
Labor  is efficient  in processing  applications,  especially  in view of the volume  of business;  this is reflected
by an average  processing  period  of 3 working  days for electronic  submissions  and 7 working  days for all
others (Singapore  Ministry of Labor, 1995).  Malaysia is less successful at enforcing and regulating
permits,  due to greater challenges  with respect to the size of its foreign labor force and its vast territory
and borders. Nevertheless,  Malaysia  exhibits significant  institutional  capacity  that has improved  during
the recent wave of development.
Additional  explanatory factors  of  Singapore's  and  Malaysia's  effective  foreign  labor
management  include the structure  of their economies  and the associated  skills mix which accommodates
foreign  workers. For example,  Singapore's production  base is highly diversified and labor-intensive  in
fairly high value-added  industries. Moreover, government  policy promotes private sector development
and encourages  investment  and foreign  participation  with a view to competing  on international  markets.
Both countries  are outward-oriented  and export-driven,  in addition  to importing  intermediate  goods,  labor
and technology. The Malaysian economy still depends to a large extent on commodity  exports that
demand unskilled labor (such as rubber, timber and palm oil) and a manufacturing  sector that accounts
for almost 25 percent of total employment  and more than 30 percent of GDP (World Bank, 1995;
International  Monetary  Fund, 1997).32
Despite  the public sector's integral  role in industrial  policy,  the actual size of public employment
including public enterprises is moderate, at less than  18 percent in Singapore, and 8 percent for
government  services  alone (Soon  and Tan, 1993). Economic  growth  in both Malaysia  and Singapore  has
been integrally  linked to job creation and increased  value added, thereby contributing  to private sector
growth  through aggregate  demand  and positive  synergies  conducive  to dynamic  growth. This lies in stark
contrast to  the oil-based economies of the GCC countries, whose output is driven by petroleum
production  and world oil prices.  Non-oil production,  characterized by large public industrial firms,
sizable government  administrations  and relatively little private activity, is typically residual, primarily
driven  by public  expenditures  that in turn depend  on cyclical  oil revenues.
Are there other  explanations  behind  the success stories  of Singapore  and Malaysia  with respect  to
foreign labor?  This paper has addressed immigration policy directly, as well as  complermentary
macroeconomic  policy, institutional  capacity  and the diversification  of economic  production. Perhaps  the
successful containment of the growing foreign labor force is the product of dynamic path-dependent
development,  such that the pattern and speed of growth are integrally linked to the expatriate labor
component. At the earliest stages of development,  the East Asian economies competed  on international
markets by exporting  inexpensive  products  manufactured  using abundant cheap labor. The subsequent
expansion  raised incomes and the private demand for better skills, constituting  indigenous  growth in
response  to private market forces largely unfettered  by government  regulation  and using foreign labor
only to meet the relatively  limited,  albeit persistent,  excess labor  demand. The oil-producers  of the GCC
followed a different path.  Economic development  was financed using windfall oil profits, with an
infusion  of public  resources  into infrastructure  and education  investment.  The relatively  rapid increase  in
demand  for goods and services outstripped  domestic capacity, leading to extensive reliance on foreign
labor.
There may be a size dimension  to this issue, in which the dynamics  of the labor force vis-a-vis
growth  and skill composition  depend  on some critical value of the foreign labor share. Below this value,
the community  of foreign workers remains self-contained  and the externalities  it generates (e.g. social
capital)  either are small or remain  within  the scope of their separate  community. Above the critical value,
however,  the expatriate labor force acquires dynamic forces of its own, with externalities  affecting  the
entire labor market and generating  additional  supply in sending countries. Within the context of such a
framework,  Malaysia's and Singapore's foreign labor policies apparently kept the share of expatriate
workers  in check below  the trigger  point, whereas in the GCC countries,  the foreign labor share exceeds33
the trigger point, leading  to increasing  foreign labor inflows  that are mutually  reinforcing  and facilitated
through  the formation  and accumulation  of social  capital.
VII. Policy Failure
Foreign labor  management  has been largely  successful  in Singapore  and Malaysia  for a variety of
reasons,  not least of which is effective immigration  policy. The news is not all good, however. The
shortcomings  of immigration  policy are evidenced  by the existence of a large informal sector of illegal
foreign  workers. Anecdotal  evidence  indicates  that employment  of foreign  workers  in the informal  sector
has grown  rapidly  in Singapore  in recent years, concurrent  with the liberalization  of restrictions  on legally
imported labor.  Malaysia's legal foreign labor force more than doubled  between 1990 and 1996, and
currently  exceeds  a million  workers,  equivalent  to 13 percent of the total labor force  according  to official
statistics. Unofficial  estimates  that include illegal workers  put the figure closer to 2 million,  however.
Illegal workers are found primarily in the construction  sector,  but also work in services,  manufacturing
and hotels and restaurants. In 1991,  nearly 30 percent of all foreign labor in Malaysia  was employed in
the construction  sector, while almost half of non-Malaysian  workers  were employed in agriculture  and
forestry  where they constituted  30 percent  of sectoral  employment  (World  Bank, 1995).
Restrictions  and permit fees have given rise to evasion through illegal recruitment and forged
documents  (a thriving industry) as well as informal trading of permits.  Firms employing workers on
unofficial  contracts  can pay lower wages and fewer  benefits  than stipulated  by law, and can impose  harsh
working conditions  on illegal workers who are powerless  to complain for fear of deportation. Most
evidence  suggests  that employers  retain the premium saved by avoiding levy payments and compensate
illegal workers below their legal counterparts;  there is some countervailing evidence, however, that
savings are passed on to the illegal workers, whose wages are effectively higher than their legal
counterparts  (Wong, 1997).
It is important  to recognize  the disadvantages  associated  with informal  employment. Workers  on
informal  contracts  do not benefit from protective  legislation  and social  benefits. Stories of abuse are not
uncommon,  especially involving  domestic workers (e.g. the Filipina maid incident in Singapore  cited
above). Whereas  the informal sector effectively acts as a buffer to the formal sector, insulating total
economic output from negative exogenous  shocks, losses are not altogether avoided. On the contrary,
they are incumbent  on the informal  sector. Without labor  market institutions  that protect  workers' rights,34
such as firing restrictions, collective bargaining and a legal framework to enforce contracts, fluctuations
in product demand are passed quickly to labor demand and thence to workers.
The East Asian crisis of 1997-98 provides a vivid illustration in which a negative regional shock
generated huge layoffs.  In Malaysia, the foreign  labor force, and  especially the  illegal foreign  labor
force, was particularly hard-hit, given their prominence  in the severely depressed construction inclustry.
An estimated 80 percent of the 700,000 workers employed in the construction  sector are non-citizens
(Associated  Press,  January  13,  1998).  Foreign  workers  were  strategically  retrenched  first--as  of
February, 1998, approximately  400,000 expatriates  had been  laid off  (Oxford Analytica,  February  16,
1998). Instead of returning to their home countries, however, many jobless expatriates opted to rermain  in
Malaysia, resulting in a massive influx to the informal sector.  Government efforts to repatriate foreigners
led to the expulsion of 20,000 expatriates lacking jobs with valid permits.  The situation was exacerbated
by crisis conditions prevailing in neighboring Indonesia and Thailand, where mass unemployment led to
illegal  migration  across  Malaysian  borders.  Contagion  effects  of  regional  exogenous  shock.s are
impossible to quantify, but there is general consensus that the Malaysian  and Singapore economies will
survive the  1997-98 crisis with most industries intact and functioning, although growth in Malaysia  is
projected to be slightly negative in  1998.  Because official statistics  do  not capture the effects on the
informal economy, however, economic losses may be underestimated.
Whereas the proliferation of a large and mostly foreign informal labor force indicates that labor
management policies  in Malaysia and  Singapore  imperfectly control the flow of foreign  workers, the
informal sector may have  played an integral role in the growth success  story.  Typically perceived  in
negative terms  as an  intrinsic drain  on  public  resources  at the  expense  of  exploited  and  underpaid
workers, the  informal  sector is  also dynamic  and flexible  and  creates jobs,  properties  that  form  the
standard pre-conditions for economic growth.  Arguments supporting the merits of informal activity have
in fact penetrated mainstream  economic theory, and  cross-country evidence  from a  variety of sources
indicates that informal wages can in fact be higher than formal sector wages (as cited above for Mexico
(Maloney, 1998)), suggesting that self-employment is not necessarily involuntary.  Despite the associated
disadvantages, the informal sector cannot be unambiguously characterized as a policy failure in light of
its contribution to growth.35
VIII. Lessons  for GCC  Countries
This paper assesses the impact of foreign labor management policies on labor outcomes in
Singapore  and Malaysia,  two countries  characterized  by robust economic  growth and significant  foreign
labor. Are there lessons  applicable  to GCC countries,  where foreign  labor force shares ranging  from 50
to 90 percent are much higher than in Singapore  and Malaysia? Several conclusions  emerge from this
analysis. The first involves  the fact that managing  foreign labor not only requires immigration  controls
but also a conducive macroeconomic  environment  and mutually reinforcing labor market institutions
regarding wage and employment policy, as well as a capacity to  enforce immigration rules.  As is
demonstrated  by Kuwait's recent experience,  it is not enough  to establish  a stable macroeconomic  climate
with favorable  investment  incentives  (necessary  but not sufficient  conditions).
Singapore  and Malaysia  benefit from more diversified economic structures  relative to the oil-
dependent  GCC economies. Moreover,  the,East Asian economies' private sectors have been integral  to
overall economic growth, especially with respect to  manufactured exports that are competitive on
international  markets.  Without comprehensive  policies that address these related issues, measures to
control foreign labor flows are likely to be ineffective. Policy changes must be considered  within the
context of the theory of second best; i.e. correcting  one distortion  will not necessarily  lead to a welfare
improvement  if other distortions  remain. In the Bahrain context of distorted  public employment  and pay
policies,  for example,  it may take a large increase  in the price of work  permits to induce  a significant  shift
in private employment  toward  Bahraini  nationals. The solution  to stem the influx of foreigners  into GCC
countries  is complex;  firm- or micro-level  data on employment  and wages would be useful in estimating
labor  demand  elasticity  in order to quantify  the likely employment  response  to various policy  measures.
It is notable  that both Singapore  and Malaysia  face difficulties  in setting the price and quantity  of
work permits in their highly regulated immigration systems where permit types vary according to
nationality,  skill level, and sector of employment,  enforced with the help of high quality administrative
capacity but also rather draconian measures  that sometimes  violate individuals' rights.  Despite labor
legislation  promoting equitable conditions  of employment,  earnings evidence from Malaysia indicates
that ethnic discrimination  among citizens  persists. Moreover,  the proliferation  of large informal sectors
consisting  primarily  of foreign workers  suggests imperfect  enforcement. In view of these challenges,  it
may be more efficient to rely on market signals to address labor  misallocations,  for example through
tradable  work  permits.36
This analysis  begins  by  identifying  a  fundamental  challenge  facing  the  GCC  countries  with
respect to excess demand for labor.  In brief, the skills shortage in the private sector cannot be met by
indigenous labor supply.  There are two trends observed in GCC labor markets: (i) for low-level jobs,
there is a  lack of domestic supply due to high reservation wages among nationals as a result of public
sector  pay  distortions,  and  (ii) for jobs  requiring  high  skills or  expertise,  there  is  little demand  for
nationals  who  lack  the  necessary  skills.  The  apparent  skills  mismatch  can  be  addressed  through
education  and  wage  policy,  with  options  ranging  from  basic  education  improvements  to  expanded
vocational training to employer-driven training programs, in order to strengthen the skills in particular
demand by private firms.
Any policy reforms will need to consider implementation feasibility with a view to the various
affected constituencies.  Political  economy issues are central to  changes in foreign  labor management
policy,  as witnessed  in  Singapore when  the proposal  for  tradable  permits  was scuttled  by  employer
opposition.  In Malaysia, tighter  immigration controls were introduced  in the  wake of the East  Asian
financial crisis, and thousands of laid off and illegal foreign workers were deported.  Original plans to
repatriate  I  million foreigners were  scaled back considerably,  however,  in response to criticism  from
neighboring Indonesia, where a massive repatriation from Malaysia would exacerbate their own severe
crisis conditions.
Political fall-out  from immigration policy  could be minimized  if the "losers"  vis-a-vis  policy
changes are  foreign  workers  who  do  not enter  into the  welfare  function  of  the host  country.  This
approach still risks negative effects on economic growth,  however, especially  in the highly segmented
GCC economies.  In Kuwait, for example, raising the cost of foreign labor is likely to affect private sector
firms disproportionately, depressing private output and raising the price  of domestically-produced  non-
tradable  goods.  Furthermore,  opposition  is  likely  to  emerge  among  those  engaged  in the  thriving
secondary market  in work permits.  Whereas foreign  labor management policy  is largely effective  in
Singapore and Malaysia for numerous reasons that include both replicable and unique factors, aspects of
political economy are nevertheless determinate in implementing and reforming policy.37
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